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Modeling Domestic Politics in International
Law Scholarship
Katerina Linos* and Jerome Hsiangt
Abstract
In this review essay, we use Eric Posner and Alan Sykes' Economic Foundations
of International Law as a springboard to highlight key analytical contributions of rational
choice models to the field of international law and to suggest avenues for future research. We
argue that Economic Foundations is unusuall comprehensive and that, as a result, the
field can now respond to a major criticism. Critics have long argued that rational choice models
are too abstract to make useful predictions about most issues relevant to international awyers.
We show that this critique is no longer jusified, in part through a systematic classifcation of
all articles published in the last decade in two of the flagshis journals of the fields of
international law and international relations, the American Journal of International
Law and International Organization, respectively.
That said, we also argue that scholars working in this research tradition can make much
progress by relaxing the most troubling assumption of existing rational choice models: the
unitary state assumption. We show how Iwo types of models widely used in other fields-
principal-agent models and domestic distributional conflict models-can befruiffuly applied to
international law debates. Our critique is thus internal; we suggest that it is possible to keep
the simplicity and clarity typical of game-theoretic models while assuming that key constituencies
within the state, rather than the state itself can rationally pursue interests. Moreover, we also
argue that some important policy implications of earlier rational choice models change when we
weaken the unitary state assumption. Finally, even though our critique is internal to the law
and economics tradition, we also show how studies from more sociologically minded traditions
often yield complementary, rather than conflicting, insights.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.
t J.S.D. Candidate, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. We are grateful to Daniel
Abebe, Anu Bradford, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton, Tom Ginsburg, Aila Matanock, Eric
Posner, Alison Post, Paul Stephan, Alan Sykes, Joel Trachtman, Mila Versteeg, and all participants
at the University of Chicago Law School's Conference on International Law and Economics for
their helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How has the use of rational actor models contributed to debates in
international law? In reviewing Eric Posner and Alan Sykes's book Economic
Foundations of International Law ("Economic Foundations"), we take the opportunity
to highlight some key insights derived from rational actor models and to specify
avenues for future inquiry. Section II of this review argues that Economic
Foundations is an unusually comprehensive volume that breaks new ground by
applying rational actor models to several understudied fields, including remedies,
state responsibility, and the law of the sea. We document this claim through a
brief review of articles published in two of the flagship journals of international
law and international relations, the American Journal of International Law ("AJIL")
and International OrganiZation ("10"), respectively.
At the same time, we argue that scholars can make much progress by
relaxing the most troubling assumption of the rational actor models currently
used in international law: the unitary state assumption. Scholars who adopt this
assumption posit that states can be elegantly understood as singular entities that
act to maximize a well-defined national interest. In Sections III and IV, however,
we show that disaggregating the state does not require abandoning the simplicity
and rigor of rational actor models. In Section III we apply principal-agent
models commonly used in many other disciplines to key debates in international
law; disaggregating the state into voters (principals) and government officials
(agents) can yield useful insights. In Section IV we compare unitary state models
to models of domestic distributional conflict among key interest groups within
each state. We illustrate how different rational actor models yield different
conclusions for international law debates. That is, we suggest that some of the
most controversial implications of earlier rational choice studies stem from the
unitary state assumption in particular, rather than from the broader assumption
that actors act rationally in pursuit of their interests. Disaggregating the state in
this fashion also allows us to highlight similarities between economic and
sociological accounts of international law, seemingly disparate perspectives. Our
primary contribution here is showing that international legal scholarship has
much to gain by applying alternative but workhorse models from political
economy to several subfields of international law.
II. DOCUMENTING ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS' CONTRIBUTIONS
Economic Foundations is a comprehensive scholarly project that neatly
presents the insights derived from rational actor models to almost every subfield
of international law. In doing so, Posner and Sykes not only summarize prior
material but also present new arguments about previously understudied areas.
The result is a noteworthy book that will undoubtedly serve as a keystone
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reference for future scholars. Here we highlight three interrelated achievements.
First and foremost, the book is unusually comprehensive when applying the
rational actor model to international law.' Posner and Sykes identify and analyze
sixteen distinct substantive international legal fields to varying depths. This is no
small achievement and is made all the more impressive by the clarity and
parsimony in exposition.
Second, even though Economic Foundations reads as a broad survey, Posner
and Sykes are not merely summarizing the state of the field; the authors are
advancing and solidifying the field in important ways. Here we believe the book
breaks new ground by applying the rational actor model to several areas of
international law that are relatively understudied, including remedies, state
responsibility, and the law of the sea. As we will show below, both international
lawyers and especially international relations scholars have written little in these
subfields. By extending rational actor models to these subfields, Posner and
Sykes open up new research agendas.
Third, Economic Foundations moves forward the methodological debate
between scholars who employ the rational actor model and those who are
critical of the approach. Traditionally, one major critique of applying rational
actor models to international law is that they are too abstract to be useful, as
they do not make concrete predictions about specific doctrinal questions and
controversies.2 Economic Foundations addresses this concern by applying
theoretical concepts to a very broad range of specific topics that interest
international lawyers. Of course, not every topic is covered: important omissions
include international tribunals, international labor law, international law
governing migrants and refugees, European Union law, and international
financial regulation.3 And the debate between rational actor scholars and others
1 Previous scholarly works have synthesized the main insights of rational choice theory as applied
to international law in general. See, for example, JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERic A. POSNER, THE
LIMITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKs: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theog of
InternationalLaw, 90 CALIF. L. Rv. 1823 (2002).
2 See, for example, Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1999). Dunoff and Trachtman highlight a common criticism of rational
actor models: "that the model either ignores-or cannot explain-many of the most important
phenomena on the international legal scene, including the rise of non-state actors; the importance
and, at times, relative independence, of international organizations; and the binding force of
international law." See also Jan Klabbers, The Relative Autononfy of International Iaw, or The Forgotten
Politics of Interdiscilinarity, 1 J. INT'l L. & INT'L REL. 35 (2004).
3 Others have employed rational choice or institutionalist frameworks to analyze these fields. See, for
example, Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
171 (2008); Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law IWorks (and How It Doesn't), 99 G~o.
L.J. 257 (2011).
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will certainly not end with the publication of this book. Instead, we expect that it
will take a new and more productive form. International lawyers interested in
remedies, state responsibility, or the law of the sea to take a few examples, will
no longer be able to claim that employing rational actor models produces no
insights into these subfields. More importantly, scholars of all stripes will be able
to comparatively evaluate the insights derived from the rational actor approach
with the insights from other approaches. In short, Posner and Sykes help prop
the door open so that future efforts can delve deeper, rather than expend energy
relitigating whether the rational actor model is a useful analytical tool for
international law.
In order to better understand Economic Foundations' contribution to the
international law and international relations literature, we survey the topics that
interested scholars in these two fields over the past decade. To systematize our
search, we focus on flagship journals in international law and international
relations: the American Journal of International Law and International Organi ation,
respectively. The articles in these two journals represent state of the art
scholarship in international law and international relations, evidenced by the fact
that both journals enjoy high prestige and broad readership. To that end, we
review every article published in AJIL and IO from January 2002 to April 2013
and classify all journal articles that address the sixteen topical international law
categories that appear in Economic Foundations. Finally, we tally the total articles
that fall into each category.
The classification process is fairly straightforward. As a threshold matter
we first determine whether each article engages international law in a substantive
way. Those that did not are classified as "Others." Almost all articles in AJIL
and a substantial minority in 10 meet this threshold criterion. We then sort all
those articles that meet the threshold criterion by their primary substantive focus
as they correspond to the sixteen topical categories in Economic Foundalions.4
Tables 1 and 2 summarize our findings. For each journal, the first column
reports the raw number of articles that fell into each category. The second
4 Some articles have multiple substantive foci; we identify their predominant focus and classify
them based on this. Articles that focus on an aspect of international law that did not fall within
the sixteen substantive categories we classify as "Others." Few articles fall in this category, which
speaks again to the comprehensiveness of Economic Foundations. Out of the four articles from AJIL
that fall into the "Others" category, two are methodological surveys about the turn towards
empirical research and the influence of political science on international law scholarship, one is
dedicated to biotechnological intellectual property rights, and one tries to pin down the exact
meaning of the proportionality principle. The number of 10 articles that fall into the "Others"
category is much larger because 10 is a political science journal, and thus many of its articles
simply have no connection to international law. Nonetheless, it is striking that so substantial a
fraction of articles in 10 relate to topics that also interest international lawyers.
Summer 2014
L-inos and Hsiang
5
Chicago Journal of International Imw
column lists each category as a percentage of the articles relevant to international
law in each journal.s
Table 1-Topics in American Journal of International Law Articles:
2002-2013
Topics AJIL Articles %Total AJIL
International Institutions 12 21%
Human Rights 7 12%
Criminal Law 6 11%
Domestic and International Law 5 9%
War 5 9%
Treaties 4 7%
Int'l Investment, Antitrust & Monetary Law 4 7%
State Responsibility 3 5%
Force 3 5%
Customary International Law 2 4%
Aliens, Foreign Property & Foreign Debt 2 4%
Attributes of Statehood 1 2%
International Environmental Law 1 2%
Law of the Sea 1 2%
International Trade 1 2%
Remedies 0 0%
Others 4
Total: 61
5 This adjustment reflects the fact that AJIL is a dedicated international law journal while LO.
covers far more topics. For the 10 calculation, we use the 166 entries that focused on
international law as the denominator, and set aside the remaining 144.
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Table 2-Topics in International Organization Articles: 2002-2013
Topics 10 Articles %Total 10
International Institutions 66 40%
Int'l Investment, Antitrust & Monetary Law 32 19%
International Trade 18 11%
Treaties 12 7%
Domestic and International Law 12 7%
Human Rights 12 7%
Attributes of Statehood 4 2%
War 4 2%
Force 2 1%
Criminal Law 2 1%
International Environmental Law 2 1%
Customary International Law 0 0%
State Responsibility 0 0%
Remedies 0 0%
Aliens, Foreign Property & Foreign Debt 0 0%
Law of the Sea 0 0%
Others 144
Total: 310
Prior to conducting the survey we held three initial expectations about the
state of the literature. First, we expected to find that several areas of
international law and international relations were well studied; we predicted that
these would include international institutions, the laws of war, human rights, and
trade. Second, and conversely, we expected to find that several categories of
international law had received limited attention, from both international law
scholars and (especially) international relations scholars. We predicted that these
categories might include the law of the sea, remedies, and the two separate
amalgam categories of aliens, foreign property and foreign debt, and
international investments, antitrust and monetary law. Third, we expected
international law scholars and international relations scholars to be interested in
different aspects of international law.
We find that the topics receiving the most attention from both groups of
scholars are in fact international institutions, human rights, and trade. This is
consistent with our initial expectations. Interestingly, while we had expected that
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certain categories would receive less scholarship than other categories, we were
not expecting such a dramatic difference. For example, we find that there is very
little scholarship on remedies, state responsibility, and aliens, foreign property
and foreign debt. Even more strikingly, we discover that AJIL and 10 contained
no articles on remedies since 2002.
We also find that, consistent with our third initial expectation, international
law scholars and international relations scholars are largely interested in different
aspects of international law. To be sure, scholars in both fields pay substantial
research attention to international institutions. Similarly, to a much lesser extent,
scholars in both fields also pay attention to treaties, the interaction between
domestic and international law, human rights, and international investments, and
antitrust and monetary law.
Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the research interests of
the two fields. Given that we limit our focus to topics in international law, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the scholarship produced by international law scholars
encompasses a much broader set of international law categories. Indeed, we
found that fifteen of the sixteen topical categories enumerated in Economic
Foundations were represented by at least one article in AJIL. By contrast, not a
single article out of 310 published in 10 since 2002 engages the topics of
customary international law, state responsibility, remedies, aliens, foreign
property and foreign debt, and the law of the sea. The scarcity of international
relations articles on these topics simply underscores Economic Foundations'
contributions to international law. Since international relations scholars do not
appear to engage extensively with these subfields, and few international law
scholars use rational choice models, Posner and Sykes must be among the first
to introduce rational actor models to these subfields. Indeed, Posner (with Jack
Goldsmith) and Sykes previously produced the foundational rational actor-based
international law articles on customary international law and the law of the sea.'
Some other legal scholars have used rational actor models to engage state
responsibility.' But we do not know of other scholarship that has utilized the
rational actor model to analyze remedies, or the treatment of aliens, foreign
property and foreign debt. Thus the contribution of Economic Foundations to
international law theory is especially pertinent in these understudied subfields.
6 SeeJack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theog of Customay International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113 (1999); Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea, 104 AM. J.
INT'L L. 569 (2010).
7 See Christopher D. Stone, Common but Dyerentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 276 (2004); Steven R. Ratner, Regulatoy Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 475 (2008).
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III. PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
While Economic Foundations makes major progress by extending the scope of
law and economics to many new areas of international law, we believe there
remains ample open space for future research. This is because the analysis in this
volume-which coincides with the approach most commonly used in the
international law and law and economics literature-relies on a set of particularly
rigid assumptions about state behavior.8 In the pages that follow, we explore
what progress can be made when we relax the foremost (and perhaps most
problematic) assumption inherent to their model: the unitary state assumption.
This assumption treats the state as a single entity pursuing the "national
interest"; it assumes away cleavages between different interest groups, or
between leaders and citizens.' We contend that scholars can make much
progress in the study of international law by first relaxing the unitary state
assumption and then applying principal-agent models and domestic
distributional conflict models. Indeed, scholars have already successfully and
widely used such models in the study of international organizations.o We explain
why these models can serve as useful tools for analyzing many other aspects of
international law as well.
To support our contention, we begin Section III by summarizing key
insights derived from applying the principal-agent models to other fields. We
then explain how Economic Foundations helpfully employs these models to explain
the laws of state responsibility, but does not extend this same analysis to
important debates on international debt. We show how major conclusions on
topics such as odious debt change radically when we move from a unitary state
framework to principal-agent analysis. We continue by exploring the study of
international organizations, another field where the principal-agent model has
already yielded important insights. Finally, we conclude Section III by examining
the potential of the principal-agent model in explaining the laws of war. At first
glance, the laws of war may seem like an unlikely candidate for principal-agent
analysis. After all, the assumption that there exists a single national objective that
unites a country's government, people, and interest groups is perhaps strongest
8 See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN 0. SYKES, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
18 (2013) (stating "[t]he assumption that states have well defined preferences and act rationally to
maximize their welfare in relation to those preferences is concededly simplistic").
9 For critiques arguing against assuming away cleavages, see, for example, Joel P. Trachtman,
Internaional Law and Domestic Political Coalidons: The Grand Theory of Compliance n4ith Intemational Law,
11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 127 (2010); KATERINA LINos, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY
DIFFUSION: How HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013).
10 See, for example, DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G.
Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006).
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during wartime. Nevertheless, we show that principal-agent models can be a
helpful analytical tool, even during extraordinary crisis. In Section IV we turn to
domestic distributional conflict models and demonstrate their potential for
international law scholarship.
A. Overview of Principal-Agent Theory
Scholars have long found principal-agent models useful for exploring the
problems that arise from delegation. For instance, principal-agent models have
been used extensively by scholars working on administrative law, employment
law, and corporate law." A starting assumption of principal-agent model analysis
is that the principal and agent often hold divergent interests. Although the
principal wants the agent to act in furtherance of the principal's interests, the
agent will often find it profitable to act in his own interests. Moreover, the agent
will be able to do so because the agent has additional private information about
the task assigned to him and the situation on the ground. This information is
largely unavailable to the distant principal. Therefore, depending on the
circumstances, the principal may find it difficult and costly to closely monitor
the agent's performance. This dual phenomenon of information asymmetry and
suboptimal monitoring creates "agency slack," a term that describes the amount
of room that an agent has to carry out action independent from the principal's
control. Ultimately, substantial agency slack can allow the agent to take large
risks whose consequences will be borne primarily by the principal. 2
Because of this fundamental tension, the principal must find ways to
induce the agent to act on her behalf. The principal can do this in various ways:
for example, by promoting organizational discipline, modifying agent incentives
through rewards and punishments that reduce shirking and opportunistic agent
behavior, and by better monitoring the agent."
11 See, for example, Tom S. Clark, A Prinapal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55,
76 (2008); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarcy of justice.
Testing a Prinapal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Grcuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci. 673
(1994); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Prinapal Agent Perspective (with
applications to the SEC), 44 PUBLIC CHOICE 147 (1984); Kimberly D. Krawiec, OrganiZational
Misconduct: Beyond the Princpal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 571 (2005); Bengt Holmstrom &
Paul Milgrom, Multitask Pinapal-AgentAnalyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and job Design, 7
J. L. EcON. & ORG. 24 (1991).
12 See Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation Under
Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Prinapal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, at 501.
13 See generally D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991); Daniel L. Nielson &
Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International OrganiZations: Agency Theory and World Bank
Environmental Reform, 57 INT'L ORG. 241 (2003).
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B. State Responsibility and Odious Debt
Principal-agent models can be very useful for analyzing concepts in
international law. Economic Foundations demonstrates this by exploring the
concept of state responsibility through the principal-agent lens. Because the
analysis in the state responsibility chapter is thought provoking and useful, our
main task here is to extend it to other chapters. We start by arguing that applying
principal-agent models would change the analysis and conclusions of a set of
closely related chapters examining when states are responsible for paying back
their debts' 4 and when these debts can be repudiated as odious."
The underlying puzzle that drives the chapter on state responsibility is this:
Why and when does legal responsibility attach to states? Posner and Sykes
answer this question by turning to a domestic law analogy. To begin, they
suggest that the logic behind state responsibility is much like the logic of
vicarious liability in domestic law.' 6 The basic principle behind domestic
vicarious liability is straightforward. By legally attaching liability to employers
(principals) for wrongs committed by employees (agents) during the scope of
employment, vicarious liability induces firms to internalize much of the cost of
their activities. This happens through two pathways. First, employers are
incentivized to monitor and make sure that their employees are behaving in
nondestructive ways. Second, even if monitoring efforts are poor, "it is possible
that vicarious liability is nevertheless useful because of its effect on prices
alone."" That is to say, even in situations where employers have limited ability to
monitor their employees, the price of final products and services should reflect
the additional costs that firms incur by paying legally mandated compensation
for harms. Over time-and as long as these firms are operating in a competitive
market-firms that pay less legally mandated compensation by inflicting fewer
harms on third parties should be able to sell cheaper goods and expand their
market share.
From this starting point, Posner and Sykes draw the analogy to the
international arena. The government is an entity (the agent) that serves the
interests of domestic constituencies (the principal). However, this is a somewhat
uncomfortable analytical fit. In theory, voters and interest groups are the
principals in a democracy. By contrast, it is more difficult to assess the principal-
14 See Posner & Sykes, supra note 8, at 113-38, 155-62.
15 For an overview of the odious debt debate, see Tom Ginsburg & Thomas S. Ulen, Odious Debt,
Odious Credit, Economic Development, and DemocratiZation, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (2007); see
also Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. EcON. R1Lv. 82 (2006).
16 See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 113-17.
1 Id. at 115.
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agent relationship in autocracies. Regardless of regime type, Posner and Sykes
note that it is "unclear in some cases whether any entity has the capacity to
monitor state 'agents.""' Because the analogy is problematic, Posner and Sykes
conclude, and we agree, that as long as monitoring is possible, attaching responsibility
to states for the acts of government officials is desirable. In these situations,
domestic principals will endeavor to monitor state agents in order to limit costly
violations, thus producing the prudential behavior that minimizes liability."
If monitoring is ineffective (or nonexistent), principal-agent models suggest
a second mechanism through which entity liability can increase societal welfare:
the pricing mechanism. Unfortunately, Posner and Sykes also make it clear that
the pricing mechanism does not work well-if at all-in the international arena.
Posner and Sykes state that "[s]tate activity is not in general 'priced,' and the
determinants of the scale of state activity in equilibrium are much less clear."20
This is because states do not operate in competitive marketplaces as firms often
do. Interest group politics, rather than market pressures, determine the scale of
government activity. As a result, Posner and Sykes conclude that "[w]here
monitoring is unlikely to occur or to be effective, the case for state responsibility
is weak unless one can somehow be confident that the scale of government
activity is excessive in the absence of state responsibility."2' This general analysis
of state responsibility is persuasive.
Given this broad theoretical framework, Posner and Sykes's analysis of
state responsibility for debts, and in particular their critique of the odious debt
doctrine, is surprising. That is, the chapters on state responsibility and odious
debt seem inconsistent because their odious debt critique relies on an argument
they previously rejected: that the pricing mechanism can lead governments to
operate at the optimal size. In general, international law makes governments
responsible for debts incurred by prior administrations and does not allow
unilateral renunciation. The odious debt doctrine is a possible exception to this
rule. Under this controversial doctrine, successor regimes are not responsible for
paying the debts of prior regimes if three conditions are met: (1) "a 'despotic
ruler' incurs a debt which is not in the interest of the state, (2) the debt produces
no benefit for the populace, and (3) the creditor knows about
the odious purpose of the funds they are advancing." 22
18 Id. at 116.
19 See id. at 118-19.
20 POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8 at 116.
21 Id. at 121.
22 See Christoph G. Paulus, Debts, MAx PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 27,
available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
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Posner and Sykes concede that monitoring is unlikely to have any impact
on unaccountable dictators.23 Indeed, they argue that the dictator actually
becomes the principal and subverts any domestic mechanisms that would hold
him accountable for his violations of international law-an inversion of the
traditional principal-agent relationship.24
Instead, they make an argument about the size of government activity,
suggesting that while some corrupt dictators use foreign loans entirely for
personal consumption, others become rich by skimming off the profits of public
works projects. For example, a dictator might take out a $10 million loan, use $9
million to build a bridge that will benefit the public, and pocket the extra $1
million.25 Posner and Sykes thus worry that the odious debt doctrine might
reduce valuable lending for public works to developing countries with autocratic
regimes.
Our view is that this is precisely an argument that state responsibility can
somehow bring the scale of state activity closer to the optimal level, the
argument they persuasively rejected earlier on. Put simply, it is problematic to
rely on competitive market pressures to induce any government-including a
government in a well-functioning democracy-into providing the optimal
number of bridges. Even in a democracy, and much more in a dictatorship, it is
very hard to tell whether an additional bridge will contribute to societal well-
being, or whether it will be a bridge to nowhere.
That said, we share the concerns articulated by Posner and Sykes and by
many scholars in the development community that the odious debt doctrine is
one that needs to be precisely delimited, lest a broad version of this doctrine
frighten investors and decrease investment in broad swaths of the developing
world.26 One way to identify precisely the scope of the odious debt doctrine is by
returning to core concepts of principal-agent analysis. For example, effective
monitoring has long been identified as vital to protecting the principal's
interests. Are any autocratic regimes at least partially monitored? Barbara
el525?rskey=jNZofs&result=1&prd=EPIL (last visited May 9, 2014) (discussing Alexander
Sack's theory of odious debt).
23 See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 119.
24 See id.
25 See id. at 160.
26 See, for example, Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law 5-7 (UNCTAD
Working Paper No. 185, July 2007), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20074-en.pdf
(last visited May 9, 2014) (examining the limits of past invocations of the odious debt doctrine
and exploring the promise of a unified international tribunal to determine odiousness); ODETTE
LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POITIcs, REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN MODERN
FINANCE (forthcoming 2014); Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 15, at 83 (noting that loan
sanctions would only work in some instances).
Summer 2014
I inos and Hsiang
13
Chicago Journal of International Iaw
Geddes and Jessica Weeks usefully differentiate between many autocracies in
which the regimes are beholden to interest groups such as party elites or the
military and "personalistic" dictatorships in which a dictator has absolute control
and is only responsible to himself.27 This suggests that monitoring of state agents
should be possible not only in democracies but also in some autocracies whose
leaders are beholden to party elites or the military. By contrast, it is implausible
to argue that personalistic dictators can effectively monitor themselves. Thus the
clearest case for the application of the odious debt doctrine should thus concern
debt incurred by personalistic dictatorships.
C. International Organizations
Principal-agent models are widely used to understand one important
subfield of international law: the study of international institutions. Economic
Foundalions claims that "international law rests on only a handful of weak
international institutions"2 8  and that "the argument for international
delegation . . . has been rejected" outside of the EU.29 We disagree with these
assertions. At a minimum, many scholars believe international organizations are
increasingly important.30 Indeed, Tables 1 and 2 above suggest that international
institutions are by far the most studied topic in both international law and
international relations. That said, we agree with Posner and Sykes that when
states delegate power to international bodies, they incur significant sovereignty
costs. To explore these costs and how they can be limited, we briefly review
some of the key articles applying principal-agent models to the study of
international organizations. We then showcase the promise of principal-agent
models in this field, their limits, and the ways in which economic and
sociological analyses can be fruitfully combined.31
States (the principals) are thought to empower international organizations
(the agents) to improve individual states' welfare through multilateral
coordination. States empower international organizations when the cost of
27 BARBARA G oDDES, PARADIGMS AND SAND CASTLES: THEORY BUILDING AND RESEARCH DESIGN
IN COMPARATIVE PoITIcs 50-51 (2003); Jessica L. Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime 7)pe
and Signaling Resolve, 62 INT'L ORG. 35, 45 (2008).
28 POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 79.
29 Id. at 84.
30 Seefor example, Josf, E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 1-4 (2006);
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal International Organi.ations, 42 J.
CONFucT RESO. 3 (1998).
31 International organizations are the prime candidates for principal-agent analysis in part because it
is relatively easy to keep the unitary state assumption intact. Even so, more nuanced analysis of
international organizations casts doubts over the integrity of the assumption, as we will show
below.
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running and participating in an international organization is lower than the cost
of producing the same benefits via direct state interaction.32 Pincipal-agent
analysis suggests important obstacles that can reduce or even eliminate these
anticipated welfare gains. International organizations are often subject to a
tremendous amount of agency slack because states do not have the resources or
political coordination to closely monitor the internal workings of international
organizations.33 In turn, international organizations can exploit this agency slack
and pursue agendas that diverge from states' interests.34
Concerns about agency slack are most intense in an international
organization such as the EU: the European Commission and the European
Court of Justice have both made important decisions contrary not only to
individual states' interests, but also to the positions of all of the EU's state
members. Indeed, a very typical debate pits some member states, eager to retain
power in national capitals, against powerful EU institutions looking to centralize
power in Brussels. We highlight Mark Pollack's work as a particularly nuanced
way of understanding how principals can monitor strong agents.
Pollack identifies four mechanisms member states have introduced to
monitor the EU bureaucracy, and the EU Commission in particular: (1) "police-
patrol" oversight, realized in the EU as "comitology;" (2) "fire-alarm" oversight;
(3) ex post sanctions; and (4) and revision of the constitutive agreements.3 ' The
comitology system is an oversight scheme in which E.U member states serve on
committees with advisory, management, and regulatory functions to modify EU
rules. 36  It is a form of oversight that requires extensive resources and
participation from the member states. Fire-alarm oversight allows states and
even individuals to bring complaints against specific Commission decisions.
Other EU organs also have a role in monitoring the Commission. Ex post
sanctions are typically only pursued if both comitology and fire-alarm oversight
has failed to change behavior. In such cases, member states can cut financial
32 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 30, at 9; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal,
The Rational Design ofInternationalInstitutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761 (2001).
33 In response, some scholars have argued that nontrivial delegation is rare. See Andrew T. Guzman
& Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth ofInternational Delegation, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1693,1694-95 (2008).
34 See Roland Vaubel, Prinapal-Agent Problems in International OrganiZations, 1 RiV. INT'L ORG. 125
(2006); Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, supra note 13. But see Laurence R. Helfer,
Monitoring Compliance with Unratified Treaties: the ILO Experience, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193
(2008) (arguing that states have gradually expanded the International Labor Organization's
monitoring power, contrasting with traditional principal-agent predictions about states seeking to
discipline and restrict "rogue" 10 agents); Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in Intemaional
OrganiZations: Globali.ation and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. Rizv. 649 (2006).
35 Mark A. Pollack, Delegation, Ageng, and Agenda Setting in the European Community, 51 INT'L ORG. 99,
113-14 (1997).
36 Id.
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support, refuse to comply, and even try to force the resignation of EU
commission members." Finally, EU member states can revise the treaties
constituting the EU-this has happened four times in the last twenty-five years.
This is a particularly costly process, as treaty revisions require the unanimous
approval of all EU member states and national referenda in several countries.
One such treaty revision, the introduction of the Barber Protocol, was clearly
intended to limit the European Court of Justice's ability to impose large financial
burdens on national pension systems."
However, even complex monitoring schemes cannot fully solve the
principal-agent problem. This is because international organizations, by
definition, report to multiple principals. Achieving sufficient unity among these
states so that they can operate as a collective principal is often a tall order.
Moreover, international organizations often interface with multiple subdivisions
within each state party, some of which may have overlapping spheres of
influence. Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney explore these dynamics in
detail by examining the World Bank and its fitful environmental reforms during
the 1980s and 1990s.39 Nielson and Tierney argue that traditional paradigms
cannot explain why an international organization such as the World Bank would
sometimes act with such a large degree of independence from its powerful
principals and yet at other times prove quite willing to bend to its principals'
preferences. Instead, they theorize that the World Bank's behavior can be better
explained in part by the World Bank's ability to exploit schisms among its
member state principals. When state principals and substate actors were
disunited in preference, the World Bank could capitalize on this and act to
further its own interests.
To bookend our discussion of principal-agent models and international
organizations, we point out that these models have not been cabined to
economic approaches to law. Sociologically minded scholars have made major
progress on the study of bureaucracies, including international bureaucracies.
Both the sociological and economics approaches understand that agents
(bureaucrats) sometimes act against the preferences of the principals (states).
While economists tend to emphasize rational shirking, sociologists tend to
highlight bureaucratic inertia and devotion to the logic of routine and
standardization. 40
37 Id. at 116-18.
3 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Protocol No. 2 concerning Article 119, July 29,
1992 (Ci91).
3 Nielson & Tierney, supra note 13, at 502.
40 See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of Internaional
OrganiZaions, 53 INT'L ORG. 699 (1999).
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The application of principal-agent models in the study of international
organizations offers several lessons for extending the model to other areas. First,
complicated organizational structures can be helpfully elucidated through
principal-agent analysis. Second, principal-agent problems are especially severe in
the presence of multiple principals, a common feature of the international
sphere. Finally, several disciplinary traditions, including sociology, highlight the
importance of the principal-agent problem.
D. The Laws of War
In the previous section, we explored the subfield of international law in
which principal-agent models have been most widely used. We now turn to a
subfield in which principal-agent models are hardest to apply: the laws of war.
We suggest that even in the area of war, the field in which the unitary state
assumption is easiest to sustain, principal-agent models remain useful as an
analytical tool.
The unitary state assumption is particularly strong when states fight wars
because of the baseline assumption that nothing unites a people as much as a
shared enemy threatening to attack.4' Moreover, institutional structures greatly
facilitate state unity when it comes to fighting wars; the military is the
paradigmatic example of a hierarchical control structure. Given the strength of
the unitary state assumption, models of interstate interaction based on
reciprocity, reputation, and retaliation concerns are most persuasive in the area
of war.
In traditional accounts, including the one put forth in Economic Foundations,
laws of war exist to reduce the cost of fighting wars for all states. For example,
joint ratification of laws of war signals that state parties plan to comply and will
reciprocally enforce the laws by retaliating against states that breach.42 Once a
war starts, states will continue to cooperate so long as both parties know that the
short-term gain from opportunistic defection is outweighed by gains from long-
term cooperation.43 This presupposes that wars will not be resolved as one-off
encounters and that states will fight many battles before achieving limited
victory. If this were not the case, and an army were on its way to an absolute
41 See, for example, Marc J. Hetherington & Michael Nelson, Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush
and the War on Terrorism, 1 POL. Sci. & Pot. 37 (2003) (explaining how in the days following the
September 11 terrorist attacks, president George W. Bush's approval soared, from 51 percent to
86 percent, as Americans rallied round the flag).
42 See James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War, 101 Am. Pou. Sci. Ri-v. 559, 559-60
(2007).
43 See GuZMAN, supra note 1, at 42.
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victory, a state would have little incentive to obey the laws of war as its
counterpart would never be able to retaliate."
Despite the strength of the unitary state assumption in this context, we
believe there is still much to be gained from disaggregating the state and
applying the principal-agent model to the laws of war. One way to do so is to
reconceptualize the military (at least in non-autocracies) as an agent of the
people, thereby opening up new avenues of inquiry. When might the goals of
civilian leadership conflict with those of the military? Civilian leadership might
want to pursue a "hearts and minds" strategy that involves minimizing enemy
casualties even at some risk for the home country's soldiers. In turn, combat
commanders may be unwilling to tolerate this risk to their units, and prefer
aggressive on-the-ground operations. Indeed, some criticize American
operations in Afghanistan on exactly this basis and suggest that overall US
strategies were undermined by US soldiers' reluctance to take risks that would
minimize Afghan casualties.45
Eyal Benvenisti and Amichai Cohen develop a more general theoretical
framework and argue that, contrary to established explanations for the laws of
war, principal-agent analysis suggests that states enter into laws of war to control
the conduct of their own military forces.46 The civilian leadership must do this to
head off intrastate conflicts that may arise when the military pursues aims that
do not benefit the civilian government. States agree to observe the laws of war in
order to impose a measure of vertical control by monitoring their military agents
and consequently lowering agency costs. Counterintuitively, Benvenisti and
Cohen argue that states "outsource" a major part of the monitoring and
enforcement to counterpart states.47
Even if, at the macro level, the threat of retaliation by a foreign army is a
key factor explaining state compliance with the laws of war, principal-agent
dynamics may helpfully explain micro-level decisions of individual soldiers to
follow or violate international rules. Laura A. Dickinson argues that the US
military has created an organizational structure that uses multiple and nested
principal-agent relationships to promote a culture of compliance with the laws of
44 POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 194.
45 PAUL FISHSTEIN & ANDREW WILDER, FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, WINNING HEARTS
AND MINDS? EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AID AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN 36
(2012).
46 Eyal Benvenisti & Amichai Cohen, War is Governance: Explaining the Logic ofthe Laws of War from a
Prinial-Agent Perpective, *5 (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2199016.
47 See id
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war.48 In times of peace, judge Advocate General's Corps ("JAG") lawyers run
educational programs that train US troops and officers in the laws of war. In
times of war, JAG lawyers are assigned to individual units as advisors in the
field; soldiers are trained to seek JAG authorization before key targeting
decisions.4 9 In turn, chains of command are structured to allow JAG lawyers
some independence in making these assessments. For example, JAG lawyers are
answerable to their superiors within the JAG corps. This sociological account
makes it at least plausible that compliance with the laws of war is shaped at least
in part by organizational structure and culture.50
While we focus here on the laws of war as they apply to state-to-state
conflicts, we believe that relaxing the unitary state assumption will also yield
important insights for conflicts that involve nonstate actors. It is not difficult to
imagine a situation where various internal government interests groups and
departments prosecute nonstate enemies in noncomplementary ways. Principal-
agent analysis may be useful as an analytical frame. More importantly, as the
actors who participate in modern warfare become more diverse to include a
growing number of separatist movements and terrorist groups, the limits of the
unitary state assumption will likely become increasingly apparent.5
IV. DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT MODELS
In this final section we turn to domestic distributional conflict models and
explore how they may help advance international law scholarship by relaxing the
unitary state assumption. There are potentially any number of ways to model
domestic distributional conflicts. For the purposes of this review, however, we
focus on two widely used approaches. The first is a political model describing
how interest groups with political clout can exercise disproportionate influence
on government policies, famously articulated by scholars, including Mancur
48 Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law
Compliance, 104 AM.J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2010).
49 See id. at 10.
so For alternative sociological approaches to culture and compliance in international law, see Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: SocakeZadon and International Human Rghts Law, 54
DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011).
51 See, for example, M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis ofComplance with the Law ofArmed
Confict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711 (2008). For an in depth
examination of the interactions between law, domestic politics, and non-state conflicts, see
GABRIELLA BLUM & PHluP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTIAWS, AND TERRORISTS: LESSONS FROM THE
WAR ON TERRORISM (2010).
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Olson, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman.52 The second model explores
why some countries unilaterally raise their regulatory standards and then seek to
export these heightened standards beyond their borders. For this model we turn
to the work of David Vogel and Anu Bradford, both of whom have argued that
under certain market conditions, states can unilaterally and successfully set high
regulatory standards for much of world. Vogel's version, termed the "California
Effect," describes California's tremendous leverage in setting high US
environmental standards, particularly in relation to automobile emissions.
Bradford's version, termed the "Brussels Effect," describes how the European
Union has successfully set de facto global standards in several fields. In the
section below, we explore how these models can be extended and illustrate how
their predictions sometimes differ from those of international law models that
assume unitary sovereign states.
A. Unitary States, Interest Group Politics and TRIPS
The unitary state assumption is central to many game-theoretic models of
international relations. Closely related principles of state sovereignty and state
consent are also fundamental to international law doctrine. We suggest that a
closer look at models of domestic distributional conflict leads us to question
what inferences we can draw from the fact that a state has consented to a
particular international agreement.
In his book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,
Olson argues that small groups with shared interests, such as producers, will
organize easily and effectively to lobby policymakers. By contrast, large and
dispersed groups, such as consumers, will face difficulty in coming together for
political purposes." As a result, governments will often develop policies that do
not maximize aggregate welfare, but instead disproportionately favor the
interests of well organized groups. Hundreds of political scientists have applied
this intuition to diverse policy fields.
Grossman and Helpman's models extend a similar intuition to trade
policy.54 Governments often adopt protectionist trade policies at the behest of
well-organized domestic producers who fear competition from abroad, even in
cases where this reduces overall welfare." This result stems from the fact that
52 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTivE ACTION: PUBLic GooDs AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965); GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS (2001).
53 See OLSON, supra note 52, at 11.
54 See GROSSMAN & HELPMAN supra note 52, at 10-13. See also Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan
Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994) [hereinafter Grossman & Helpman,
Protection for Sale].
5s Grossman & Helpman, Protection for Sale, supra note 54, at 834 & 848.
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the vast majority of a country's citizens are not represented by specialized
lobbying groups. For our purposes this means that broad statements about
whether a country gains welfare by adopting a certain trade policy are
problematic, especially when (1) ownership of industries is highly concentrated;
(2) these industries are able to make large monetary contributions to politicians;
(3) a large percentage of the population is not represented by competing interest
groups; and (4) a country is simply undemocratic. Any of these four factors may
severely skew a country's policy choices towards the preferences of well-
organized interest groups. In short, the assumption that states maximize
aggregate welfare is problematic when analyzing many governments, especially
those of highly politically unequal or undemocratic states found in much of the
developing world.
Scholars who apply the unitary state assumption are undoubtedly aware of
these insights on interest group politics. Nonetheless we believe that these
concerns are often set aside for convenience, leading to erroneous analyses. We
take the analysis of the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) in Economic Foundations as an example. Posner and Sykes
acknowledge that it is not obvious that global harmonization of intellectual
property laws produces the best outcome for the international system as a
whole." Nevertheless, they suggest that we can infer quite a lot about whether
individual states benefit from the fact that their governments consented to this
agreement. Posner and Sykes write:
The ultimate willingness of developing nations to accept TRIPS was a
consequence in large part of their ability to obtain market access
concessions on other sectoral issues, such as textiles and agriculture. Their
acquiescence suggests that as whole, developing countries believed that they
gained more from accepting TRIPS and its quid pro quo than by rejecting
it.57
A domestic distributional conflict model leads one to question how much can be
inferred from developing country acquiescence to TRIPS. TRIPS increases
patent, copyright, and trademark protections globally. In the short term, this
benefits companies with valuable patents, such as pharmaceutical companies
located in the global north. But it harms the consumers of pharmaceuticals, who
find it more difficult to obtain cheaper generic versions and are often located in
the global south. In distributional conflict models, consumers are the
paradigmatic poorly organized group that cannot obtain their fair share of policy
benefits because of the difficulty of collective action. In other words, just
because a conscious tradeoff is made does not mean we can automatically
56 See PosNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 280-81.
57 Id. at 281.
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conclude that it was welfare enhancing. 8 Let us assume, as Posner and Sykes
assert, that governments of developing countries obtained important
concessions in the fields of textile and agriculture in exchange for accepting
TRIPS. Textile and agriculture liberalization benefits many groups, including
first and foremost textile and agriculture producers who will be able to export
their products to more markets. Distributional conflict models suggest that
governments will often find it advantageous to trade off a benefit for a particular
set of producers (in this case the agriculture and textile industries) against a
larger harm for a big number of disorganized domestic consumers (in this case
the consumers of pharmaceuticals).
Of course, we are not asserting that this necessarily results in an aggregate
welfare-reducing loss. Instead, we are merely suggesting that it is difficult to
draw strong inferences from state consent, especially in areas that pit well
organized domestic producers against poorly organized consumers and in cases
of developing country governments with high levels of inequality and low levels
of democracy. It is possible that governments of states in both the global north
and especially the global south may be prioritizing the protection of entrenched
industries and well organized interest groups over consumers and more diffuse
interest groups. Whether this is an aggregate welfare gain remains, of course, an
empirical question.
B. Unitary States, Unilateral Regulatory Moves, and Global
Environmental Challenges
In direct contrast to the idea that international law is (or should be) based
on explicit state consent, scholarship has identified that some states can take a
leadership role in promoting de facto global standards through unilateral
regulations ostensibly aimed at domestic industries." Vogel and Bradford have
in fact identified two broad strands of this phenomenon, referred to as the
California Effect and the Brussels Effect. We highlight these models as their
predictions are directly at odds with more common race-to-the-bottom or race-
to-the-top models of regulatory competition common in the literature that
assume unitary states. We also believe that taking these models seriously suggests
58 See, for example, Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking International
Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011) (arguing that while it is unclear whether
developing countries as a whole are better off under TRIPS, developing countries have accrued
some actual benefits, often in unpredictable ways).
59 But see Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Environmental Conflicts: The Rise
of Green Industrial Poliy, 108 N.W. U. L. Riv. (forthcoming 2014) (highlighting the drawbacks and
conflicts that emerge when states unilaterally pursue industrial policy aimed at promoting green
industries).
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that it is particularly important to disaggregate both early mover states as well as
states that are critical to international environmental protection because of their
size and influence. 60
Both the California Effect and the Brussels Effect describe economically
powerful and motivated markets setting domestic regulatory standards that are
higher than those found in other markets. Both models require several steps.
First, for domestic political reasons, an economically powerful state implements
internal standards that are higher than standards elsewhere. Next, this powerful
state requires foreign exporters to either comply with these standards or lose
access to the market. Once this happens, foreign exporters may have to make a
choice between setting up a separate production process to accommodate the
economically powerful market or adopting the higher standard across the board.
Sometimes it makes economic sense for these exporters to take advantage of
economies of scale and adopt the higher standard wholesale."t When this
happens, the powerful state has in effect unilaterally raised global standards.
Ancillary mechanisms may also facilitate the de jure harmonization of
global standards at a high level. Once one country has adopted a high regulatory
standard, domestic interest groups in other countries may point to the foreign
regulation and start demanding higher domestic standards as well.62 Those
exporters that have adopted the higher standard wholesale will likely support
these demands as they have already invested in the change and would thus have
a (at least short-term) competitive advantage against smaller firms selling to the
domestic market that have not yet adopted the higher standard." And finally,
large export-oriented firms from various countries may seek to harmonize global
rules at the higher standard in order to reduce competition from firms content
to operate in smaller markets with lower standards.64
60 These states often include the EU, the US, China, etc. For an example of how to disaggregate and
open the "black box" of the state, see Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, InternationalAgreements,
Internal Heteqgeneity, and Climate Change: The 'vo Chinas" Problem, 50 VA.J. INT'L. L. 325 (2010).
61 See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAIL
ECONOMY 250-56 (1995) [hereinafter VOGEL, CONSUMER & ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONi. See
also David Vogel, Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental
Protection, 4 J. EUR. PUB. Pot'Y 556, 561-62 (1997).
62 See Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemisty of
RegulatoU Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897 (2009); LINOS, supra note 9; Katerina Linos, Diffusion
through Democray, 55 AM.J. Pol. SC. 678 (2011).
63 These would include firms that do not export to the economically powerful market. See VOGEL,
CONSUMER & ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 61, at 6.
64 For an example of how similar domestic interest group mechanics may combine with competitive
pressures to produce policy coordination in other international legal fields, see Stavros Gadinis,
The Politics of Competition in IntemationalFinancialRegulation, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J 447, 451-55 (2008).
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Bradford spells out important scope conditions for these effects to occur:
she suggests that countries can externalize their domestic regulations when those
countries have a large domestic market, have sufficient regulatory capabilities,
have the political will to enforce regulations, and regulate industries that are
relatively inelastic." For example, the EU is able to externalize a significant
amount of consumer product safety regulations; however, it is not particularly
successful at exporting financial regulation-a field where capital can flee to
jurisdictions with lower standards with relatively little cost."
An extension of these models to the environmental realm offers some
reasons for optimism. We believe that understanding how international
environmental protection can result from the actions of substate actors enriches
our ability to craft meaningful environmental protections in the future. For
example, scholars have traditionally explained the Montreal Protocol as an
exemplar of successful state-to-state cooperation." We argue that substate actors
were critical to the development of the Montreal Protocol and that lessons
drawn from this successful effort can show how substate actors can be
mobilized to help solve future challenges.
So how can we better explain the development of the Montreal Protocol,
"the most important and successful environmental treaty?"" This is a huge
puzzle for models that assume unitary state actors, including those presented in
Economic Foundations. These explanations of the Montreal Protocol fall short in
two respects, both of which stem from taking states to be unitary. First, they do
not offer a particularly robust explanation for why it was in the United States'
interests to unilaterally pursue a ban on chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"). While
we agree that in some instances it may not be necessary to explore how state
preferences are endogenously set, in this case domestic interest group politics
have direct consequences on how the Montreal Protocol ultimately came about.
It is difficult to explain US behavior both before and during negotiations
without understanding the interplay between environmental groups, chemical
firms, and regulatory agencies. Second, Economic Foundations offers little in way of
explaining why the European states eventually signed onto the agreement. What
is curious here is that Posner and Sykes note that the United States offered side
payments to developing states-but not to European ones-to secure their
65 See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. Rnv. 1, 5 (2012).
66 Id. at 17.
67 See, for example, Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particulary Remarkable,
and Remarkably Particular, 19 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 49, 49 (2000); Donald Kaniaru, Rajendra
Shende, Scott Stone, & Dutwood Zaelke, Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance Against Abrupt
Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE Div. L. & POL'Y 3, 3 (2006).
68 POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 229.
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cooperation on the ban.6" If side payments were not the mechanism that induced
European cooperation, what was?
We believe that suspending the unitary state assumption and applying
models such as those advanced by Vogel and Bradford more straightforwardly
explain the development of the Montreal Protocol. Once the United States
unilaterally implemented CFC regulations, European chemical firms lost access
to the US market. To access the US market, the European chemical firms had to
develop substitute chemicals and implement their attendant production
processes. Whether European chemical firms thought this would be a profitable
venture is an empirical question, although the evidence suggests that these firms
were initially reluctant.70 After all, the European domestic market for CFCs was
large, and European chemical firms could continue to export to developing
countries. Yet once the United States succeeded in convincing developing
countries to agree to a CFC ban, the position taken by the European chemical
firms was no longer tenable." At this point, European firms had to anticipate
losing access to all markets except their own. And while they would remain
competitive within Europe domestically for a time, they feared they might find
themselves at a competitive disadvantage should European public opinion ever
turn against CFCs. This outcome seemed likely as holding out against a CFC ban
would make European chemical firms obvious targets for environmental
advocacy groups.
While the Montreal Protocol is only one case (and a particularly successful
one at that), we believe that it shows that the prognosis for environmental
cooperation is perhaps rosier than what Economic Foundations concludes.72 Under
some circumstances, unilateral shifts in domestic regulatory focus can produce
global effects. Both the European Union and California have already made some
costly unilateral efforts to fight climate change. Exporting these standards will
undoubtedly prove incredibly challenging, as will negotiating a global climate
change treaty. But at a minimum, if we suspend the unitary state assumption, the
toolbox for global environmental protection expands.
69 See id at 230.
70 Richard Elliot Benedick, The Improbable Montreal Protocol: Science, Diplomacy, and the Ozone Layer, in
THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL: CELEBRATING 20 YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS: OzoNE
LAYER AND CLIMATE PROTECTION (Donald Kaniaru, ed.) 43, 44-46 (2007).
7' Id
72 See Scorr BARRETr, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATY-MAKING (2003).
Summer 2014
Modeling Domestic Politics 1inos and Hsiang
25
Chicago journal of International Law
V. CONCLUSION
Economic Foundations succeeds in marking rational actor models (and the
attendant economic analysis) as mature approaches to international law. Before
the publication of this book, it seemed fair to criticize these models for their
inability to speak to many debates in international law; many international
lawyers had misgivings about whether analysis based on these models could
generate actionable predictions. We believe this concern is no longer justified.
Posner and Sykes have gone a long way towards putting that concern to rest.
That said, as the discussion matures, it is both important and possible to
relax the most troubling assumption of rational choice models in international
law: the unitary state assumption. This development is timely as international law
scholarship gives increasingly greater prominence to nonstate actors while
international relations scholarship gives greater consideration to domestic
politics. Our review suggests two ways to structure future scholarship that will
maintain the simplicity and analytic rigor that characterizes rational actor models.
First, we present some ways in which scholarship can explore the relationship
between the government and the governed through principal-agent models.
Second, we examine the how domestic distributional conflict models can
helpfully guide analysis of relationships among interest groups and international
law. Yet these suggestions are only a beginning; there is much fertile ground in
international law for further exploration.
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